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Abstract
The economic theory of intellectual property rights is based on a rather nar-
row view of both competition and technological knowledge. We suggest some ways
of enriching this framework with a more empirically grounded view of both and,
by means of a simulation model, we analyze the impact of di®erent property right
regimes on the dynamics of a complex product industry, that is an industry where
products are complex multi-component objects and competition takes place mainly
through di®erentiation and component innovation. We show that, as the complex-
ity of the product spaces increases, stronger patent regimes yield lower rates of
innovation, lower product quality and lower consumers' welfare.
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11 Introduction
From the point of view of economic theory the protection of intellectual property has
always been a matter of an uneasy balance between the divergent needs of providing
su±cient returns and incentives to the production of innovations on the one side, and
of promoting their quick social di®usion and therefore a prompt erosion of innovators'
monopoly power to the advantage of consumers on the other side.
That a strong patent system is far from being the one and only necessary tool to
achieve that balance was well expressed by Fritz Machlup back in 1958: \If we did not
have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of
its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent
system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge,
to recommend abolishing it" (Machlup 1958).
Recently patents and intellectual property rights (IPRs henceforth) have become hot
topics in the economic debate as the number of patents has increased exponentially and
some profound institutional and policy have determined the expansion of the patentabil-
ity domain to include software, research tools, business methods, genes and arti¯cially
engineered organisms. The so-called \patent explosion" has been documented and vari-
ous explanations have been suggested (see for instance Kortum and Lerner (1998), Ja®e
(2000), Lerner (2002), Ja®e and Lerner (2004) and Hall (2005)). Altogether a rather
widespread consensus is emerging among many economists and practitioners alike that
something is going wrong in the patent system that, instead of balancing contrasting
needs and enhancing social welfare, is now mainly serving the interests of those compa-
nies holding large portfolios of patents (see Dosi, Marengo, and Pasquali (2006) for a
critical discussion). The sharp increase in the strength of protection, the expansion of
the domains of patentability and the loosening of standards for granting patents has de
facto widely broadened the role of patents well beyond the purported aim to provide su±-
cient incentives to innovative e®orts. Patents are now used for strategic purposes, e.g. as
means for entry deterrence, for blocking rivals' innovations, for infringement and counter
infringement suits against rivals, as \bargaining chips" in the exchanges of technology
among ¯rms and to signal to ¯nancial markets likely streams of future pro¯ts (Hall and
Ziedonis 2001, Ja®e 2000, Winter 2002).
Not surprisingly, in some industries top executives and representatives of industry
associations are repeatedly expressing concerns for a state of a®airs in which everybody
is patenting more and more and asking for more protection just because the others do
so, while believing that this race for more and stronger patents has little to do do with
incentives to innovate (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter 1987, Cohen, Nelson, and
Walsh 2000, David 2002).
Particular concerns regard the so called \complex product industries". Complex prod-
2ucts are those made of many di®erent components whose production typically involves
di®erent underlying bodies of technological knowledge. Most artifacts in electronic, com-
puter, ICT, automotive, aerospace, software industries belong to this category. Complex
products, because of their multi-components and multi-technology nature, tend to involve
multiple patents belonging to many di®erent companies determining what has been called
the \tragedy of the anti-commons" (Heller 1998). For instance, \there are more than 400
patents that are essential to produce a DVD. And others have commented on the hun-
dreds of patents typically related to a computer operating system or a PC. Yet the patent
law remains mired in a nineteenth century paradigm of essentially one patent, one prod-
uct" (Testimony of Chuck Fish, Vice President and Chief Patent Counsel Time Warner,
in front of the US Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on intellectual
property, 14th June 2005).
In complex product industries, patents are used to block rival use of components and
acquire bargaining strength in cross-licensing negotiations (Gallini 2002, Ziedonis 2004).
The presence of many property rights insisting on complementary components may hinder
innovation and, in particular, systemic innovation which involves many components and
modules. In fact these industries are often characterized by fast radical innovation in the
initial stages under weak IPR protection, whereas patents assume a prominent role in the
¯rms' competitive strategy in later and less innovative stages.
So, for example, Bessen and Maskin (2000) observe that computers and semi-conductors
while having been among the most innovative industries in the last forty years, have his-
torically had weak patent protection and rapid imitation of their products. It is well
known that the software industry in the US experienced a rapid strengthening of patent
protection in the 80's. They suggest that \far from unleashing a °urry of new innovative
activity, these stronger rights ushered in a period in which R&D spending leveled o®, if
not declined, in the most patent-intensive industries and ¯rms" (Bessen and Maskin 2000,
p. 2). In fact in such industries imitation might be promoting innovation while strong
patents might inhibit it. Bessen and Maskin argue that this phenomenon is likely to
occur in those technologies whose innovative activities are characterized by a relevant
degree of sequentiality (each innovation builds on a previous one) and complementarity
among di®erent search lines. A patent actually prevents non-holders from the use of the
idea (or of similar ideas) protected by the patent itself and in a sequential world full of
complementarities this turns out to slow innovation rates down. Conversely, it might well
happen that ¯rms would be better o® in an environment characterized by easy imitation.
Imitation would indeed reduce current pro¯ts but it could also raise the probability of
further pro¯table innovations to be realized. In addition, the generation of streams of
diversi¯ed and complementary products, obtained by combinations of innovation and im-
itation, often increases the overall size of the market, increasing pro¯t opportunities also
for early innovators. As Paul David argues, IPRs are not necessary for new technologies,
3on the contrary di®erent institutional mechanisms more similar to open science might
work more e±ciently (David 1993, David 2002).
More in general, there seems to be in the standard pro-patent argument a lack of
consideration of the speci¯cities of sectors and technologies. As we will argue, the pro
patent arguments rests upon assumptions on the nature of technology and competition
which are not, or at least not always, in line with the reality of (some) industries and
technologies. Thus the claim that without patents imitators would rapidly cannibalize the
innovator's pro¯ts and therefore, anticipating it, no ¯rm would have su±cient incentives
to invest in costly R&D is not always correct.
In this paper we develop a model of product innovation and industry evolution in
complex product industries that explores the foregoing conjecture, showing that, indeed,
strong patent regimes are likely to hinder rather than foster innovation. Such outcomes are
driven by two major properties of technologies and markets for complex products. First,
both innovative and imitative search are costly and di±cult, with complementarities and
interdependencies among components putting heavy constraints on possible search paths.
If many of these possible paths are blocked by pending patents, very few opportunities
for further innovation might be left open. Second, competition in these complex product
spaces typically proceeds through the creation of sub-markets: demand is heterogeneous
and ¯rms can diversify products by o®ering di®erent combinations of components and
characteristics. Competition is not a winner-takes-all process, but is mainly a never
ending creation of new sub-markets.
The way we model our complex product space allows us to parametrize in a straight-
forward manner the main features of a patent regimes, i.e. the vertical and horizontal
amplitudes of patents and, in addition, to introduce a new dimension, which to our knowl-
edge has not been studied so far in the literature, namely what we call patent \coarseness",
indicating whether patents can be granted only on entire products, modules (ensembles
of components) or also to each component separately.
We show that as the complexity of the product space increases, stronger patents
regimes, that is regimes characterized by larger vertical and horizontal amplitude and
lower patent coarseness, yield lower rates of innovation, lower product quality and lower
consumers' welfare.
Our model is evolutionary in spirit, but whereas most evolutionary models focus on
process innovation, we exclusively model product innovation, i.e. the generation of new
combinations of components. As demand is di®erentiated, new products create new sub-
markets only loosely competing with the existing ones. We show that IPRs do indeed
have an impact not only on the incentives to do research and development but also on
the directions in which research moves and that the directions induced by strong IPR
arrangements might be far from optimal in a dynamic perspective. Moreover we show
that, other things being equal, any one IPR regime has a di®erent impact upon innova-
4tion rates depending on technological opportunities and the complexity of the underlying
technological space.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we develop our interpretative framework.
In section 3 we introduce and discuss the model. In section 4 we simulate the model and
present the main results from simulations. Finally in section 5 we highlight the major
conclusions and draw some tentative policy implications.
2 Patents, innovation and competition
The economic foundations of both theory and practice of IPR protection rest upon a
standard positive externalities, market failure argument. The argument's premise is :
since knowledge bears some features of a public good1, it will be underproduced and
will receive insu±cient investment. While the argument's conclusion - largely based on
a Coasian perspective - is that the attribution and enforcement of well-de¯ned private
property rights is the key to the solution of the externality problem (Coase 1960).
However, in the case of knowledge there are two important caveats. First, as far as
knowledge is concerned only half of the standard positive externality story seems to hold.
Knowledge externalities may indeed generate insu±cient investment in its production, but
the danger of excess exploitation cannot exist for a resource like knowledge which is not
depleted with use. On the contrary, multiple uses of knowledge are likely to generate in-
creasing returns from learning and knowledge cumulation. Property rights do not appear
as the right legal and institutional framework to solve the problem, if any, of knowl-
edge, as the economic foundations for exclusion right are simply not there. Moreover,
when granted on truly innovative knowledge, exclusion generates a particularly serious
monopoly problem because by de¯nition truly innovative knowledge is unique, does not
have close substitutes and is often a key factor of production.
Second, one of the most signi¯cant advances in the ¯elds of the economics of innova-
tion has been precisely the identi¯cation of the speci¯cities of technological knowledge in a
strict sense as distinguished from sheer information. Technological knowledge, well beyond
any description in terms of well de¯ned blueprints, involves procedures of a much more
tacit nature, often embodied in organizational practices and speci¯c to each technological
paradigm (Dosi 1988, Winter 1982). For our purpose here a fundamental implication is
that any analysis of the conditions for appropriation and di®usion of knowledge cannot
1Non rivalry of technological knowledge and its commonly understood implications have sometimes
been questioned. For instance some scholars claim that non rivalry is not the proper category (Boldrin
and Levine 2002, Boldrin and Levine 2008), and that knowledge and information are rather characterized
by (in¯nite) expansibility (David 1992), that is they are not jointly consumed like pure public goods but
can indeed be replicated. Replication of information requires some (though possibly very short) time and
involves some (though possibly very low) costs and this is enough to ensure, they show, that competi-
tive markets price innovation positively and provide incentives to innovators. However, replicability of
knowledge entails problems of its own (Winter 2008).
5abstain from considering the speci¯c features of the knowledge itself. Knowledge com-
plexity, cumulativeness, tacitness, replicability, and degree and location of technological
opportunities are fundamental dimensions for understanding the dynamics of productive
knowledge (Winter 1987).
The diversity of knowledge characteristics is re°ected also into diversity of appropri-
ability regimes. The patent monopoly is one such form of appropriation which is neither
the most e®ective nor the most utilized in many sectors (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and
Winter 1987, Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000). Teece (1986) argues that an innovation is
rarely an isolated and well de¯ned entity, while the appropriation of its economic value is
dependent upon a series of complementary assets whose control is often more fundamental
for reaping the economic returns to innovation than the regime of legal protection of the
rights of the \innovator".
How do appropriability conditions in general and regimes of IPR protection in°uence
the rates and the directions of innovative search? Several historical instances seem to
suggest that above a minimum threshold appropriability conditions and, more so, IPR
regimes exert hardly any in°uence on the rates of innovations. Thus one observes many
important innovations that, in spite of not being patented (or patented under very weak
patent regimes) have most de¯nitely produced considerable streams of economic value
both to the innovator and to society. The technologies at the core of ICT are a case to
the point. The transistor, while being patented from Bell Labs, was liberally licensed as
a consequence of antitrust litigation and pressure from the US Justice Department, and
more in general the early growth of the semiconductor industry had been driven to a
good extent by public procurement under a weak IPR regime (Grandstrand 2005). The
software industry, certainly a quite pro¯table one, similarly emerged under a weak IP
regime. The telecom industry was largely operated by national monopolies until the 90's
who were undertaking also a good deal of research, and IPRs played little role in the rapid
advance of technology in this industry. Mobile telephony also emerged under a weak IPR
regime (until the late 1980s).
What about the directions of innovative search? Circumstantial evidence suggests
that in presence of complementarities among components and diverse pieces of knowledge,
IPR regimes are likely to in°uence innovation trajectories. In particular, if technological
opportunities are not mutually independent then, by foreclosing some ¯rms' research in
some directions, patents may on the whole hinder research rather then stimulate it.
In this paper we analyze the general case of interdependencies in technological knowl-
edge. We show, also building upon some previous work of ours (Marengo and Dosi
2005, Marengo, Pasquali, and Valente 2005, Dosi, Marengo, and Pasquali 2006), that the
breadth and width of IPRs is not immaterial in determining which kind of innovation un-
dergo market testing and selection processes. As we shall see, one dimension that appears
to be crucial in our analysis is what we call the \coarseness" of patents, i.e. whether IPRs
6are de¯ned on product systems in their entirety or on components, sub-components, and
so on with ¯ner and ¯ner objects of IPRs. In a Coasian perspective the latter solution (i.e.
very ¯nely de¯ned property rights) should in principle { if it wasn't for transaction costs
{ increase e±ciency, in our framework instead it decreases the number of technological
opportunities which can be created and exploited.
A complementary issue we are going to investigate concerns the function of markets.
Nowadays a signi¯cant share of innovations are product innovations whose main purpose
and e®ect is to create new sub-markets (Sutton 1998, Klette and Kortum 1984, Klepper
and Thompson 2007) which only loosely compete with the existing ones. The perfect
competition benchmark seems therefore a quite inappropriate description of the actual
mechanisms of technological competition. Again, the pace and directions of the creation
of submarkets may be highly in°uenced by the de¯nition and attributions of IPRs and
this e®ect - we will argue - might be more important than the one measured against some
benchmark of static e±ciency.
All in all, the institutional attribution of property rights (whether e±cient or not
in a static allocative perspective) may strongly in°uence the patterns of technological
evolution in directions which are not necessarily optimal or even desirable. In this sense,
any question about the appropriate level of IP protection and degree of appropriability is
better grounded on a theory of innovative opportunities and productive knowledge (issues
on which the theory of allocative e±ciency is rather silent: cf. Winter (1982), Stiglitz
(1994) from di®erent angles).
In the next section we outline a simple simulation model in which we try to capture
at least some of the features of productive knowledge and competition we have brie°y
outlined above and use it to explore the consequences of di®erent patent regimes.
3 The model
3.1 Technology space
We model products as systems made of n discrete components fx1;x2;:::;xng. Each
component can take one out of a countable set of values xj = f0;1;:::g. Values are labels
for di®erent types of components (e.g. CPU types, wing shapes, brake cooling systems,
etc.) and at a higher value for a given component corresponds a better type in a mere
technological sense (e.g. a faster CPU) and considering the component as \stand-alone",
meaning that, as we will see, a better component does not always increase the overall
performance of the product, but only when all components are co-adapted. Finally, let X




j = f0;1;:::g that contains all possible
products.
We endow the products set X with a metric structure that easily allows to compare
products and identify their degree of diversity. In particular, we de¯ne horizontal and
7vertical diversity as our two measures and we will use them to map the horizontal and
vertical scope (breadth) of patents. The horizontal diversity between two products xi and
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Performance of a product is a function of the speci¯c combination of single components.
Performance is thus measured by a map f : X 7! R+ which maps each member x of the








(²i;j ¢ jxi ¡ xjj)
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+ K (3)
where ²i;j 2 [0;1] represents how the performance contribution of component i is a®ected
by component j and K is a constant2.
Product performance changes as a consequence of two di®erent but interrelated rea-
sons, namely a change in the technical characteristics of the single components and via
interdependencies across components. The latter determine also the \complexity" of the
product space, that is the presence and extent of the interdependencies among the com-
ponents forming a product. The coe±cients ²i;j capture such complexity. If ²i;j = 0 8i;j,
the product space does not present any interdependencies, thus an improvement in any
component always determines an improvement in the product's performance irrespective
of the state of the other components. If, on the contrary, ²i;j 6= 0 the contribution to
performance of component xi depends non monotonically also on the state of component
xj.
As to the extent of such interdependencies, single components may interact with just
a few others, or viceversa all of the n components may interact together. A special
but important case is when interactions have a modular or quasi-decomposable structure
(Simon 1969, Baldwin and Clark 2000), i.e. when the set of components is divided into
subsets (modules) characterized by strong interactions within themselves and weak or no
interactions with other subsets (modules) (see Marengo, Pasquali, and Valente (2005) and
Marengo and Dosi (2005) for a more detailed and formal treatment of this case).
The coupling between each element x 2 X and its performance value de¯nes what we
call \performance surface". The features of such surface de¯ne also the di±culty of the
2Since performance values will be used below in the computation of the utility of consumers, the
constant K ensures that the performance value is always positive.
8innovation process. At one extreme, in the case without interdependencies, autonomous,
local improvements (i.e. on single components) can generate a steady stream of successful
(i.e. performance increasing) innovations and the performance surface is characterized by
a high correlation among the performances of similar products. Only in this case can in-
novation be e®ectively decentralized and innovators can specialize on single components
or small modules whereas coordination is e®ectively ensured by some market-like selec-
tion mechanism based on a \decentralized" performance evaluation. At the other extreme
we have the case of widespread non-monotonic interactions which generate uncorrelated
performance surfaces. In these circumstances, autonomous local changes tend to be in-
e®ective and innovation requires coordinated search on many, possibly all, components
together and deliberate re-designing of the system. In this case decentralization is likely
to be ine®ective (see Marengo and Dosi (2005) for a more detailed and formal exploration
of the consequences for division of labor and governance structures).
Finally, we assume that each product type xi has an associated variable cost of pro-
duction ci which is an increasing function of performance with some random error:
ci = a + bfi + ²i (4)
where ²i is an idiosyncratic normally distributed error. For the sake of simplicity we set
¯xed costs equal to zero.
3.2 Demand
Demand depends upon prices, performance and positioning of products in the space of
product characteristics. In line with Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse (1989) and their
discrete choice model over products de¯ned in the space of characteristics, we assume there
exist a ¯nite set C of consumers. Each consumer purchases at most one unit (possibly







h = 1, de¯ned by an \ideal combination" of characteristics
the consumer would like to ¯nd in the product 3.
A consumer's utility depends upon four factors, namely the overall product perfor-
mance, the distance between the product pro¯le and the consumer's ideal one, the price
and a normally distributed error. We assume that the elasticities of utility with respect
to the ¯rst three factors are consumer speci¯c.













where fj and pj are performance and price of product xj, dj is the distance between the
product's pro¯le and consumer's i type ti, ² » N(0;¾) is a normally distributed error.
3In fact such an assumption \blackboxes" for the sake of simplicity the distinction between the tech-
nical components and the characteristics of the product. Given that our purpose is to address issues of






i are consumer speci¯c elasticities with respect to performance,
price and distance and A is a constant.







We call the market space of product xj the set of consumers:
Mxj = fi 2 C;Ui(x
j) ¸ Ui(x
h);8h 6= jg (7)
Demand for product xj is thus given by the cardinality of the set Mxj.
We assume that consumers are potentially utility maximizers, but also that there
is some inertia in their decisions at each discrete time. We thus suppose that some
proportion of consumers 4 compute their preferences over all available products, rank
them and choose accordingly, while all the other consumers simply reiterate the same
purchases of the previous period.
3.3 Firms
Firms produce only one type of product in the amount demanded by the market and have
R&D investment and output prices as their control variables. Concerning the related
behavioral rules, in the case of R&D investment decisions, we follow the phenomenolog-
ical generalizations of evolutionary models of technical change and industrial dynamics
(Nelson and Winter 1982, Winter 1984, Winter 1993) and assume that ¯rms take routine
decisions by applying rules-of-thumb, and in particular that they invest in R&D a given
share of their gross pro¯ts.
As to price decisions, we assume that ¯rms are more rational than usually assumed by
evolutionary models and make the hypothesis that they are myopically rational. In par-
ticular, we want would-be patent holders to correctly know their rent extracting potential
and endow them with the ability to ¯x a price that, even with some inertia, gives them
all the pro¯t generated by monopoly and invest in further R&D accordingly. Such be-
havioral assumptions are taken in order to preempt the argument that our results depend
upon the bounds we may put on agents' rationality and/or on the heavy restrictions on
information and access to it. Thus we want to build an a fortiori argument wherein our
conclusions would apply even more so if the most far-fetched assumptions on rationality
and information would be dropped. In this respect a crucial ingredient of the pro-patent
argument is the purported link between high monopoly pro¯ts and high R&D investment
yielding (in probability) more innovations. We want to fully preserve this link in our
model, even at the cost of less realism.
4In the simulations below we set this ratio equal to 1=4 of the population of consumers
103.3.1 Price decisions
At each discrete time prices are set by all ¯rms launching a new product and also by
a random subset of ¯rms o®ering an incumbent product that are allowed to re-compute
their prices. All other ¯rms keep their prices unchanged. Firms allowed to set or re-set
their prices may access Walrasian demand schedules of all consumers (hence they are able
to access their whole preference schedule), aggregate them and set the pro¯t maximizing
price, on the assumption that all other ¯rms keep their prices unchanged.
3.3.2 R&D and innovation
Firms invest a share of their gross pro¯ts (for simplicity we exclude external ¯nancing) in
R&D. There can be two types of R&D investment: imitative R&D and innovative R&D.
Let us call rM
i the share on pro¯ts of the former and rI
i the share of the latter for ¯rm i.
Total R&D expenses will be (rM
i + rI
i)¼i where ¼i are ¯rm i's gross pro¯ts. For the time
being and for the sake of simplicity, we exogenously ¯x both coe±cients rI and rM to 0:5
5.
We model imitative search in a straightforward way: the imitator can observe the
characteristics of the product of the most pro¯table ¯rm and imitate part of it. The
number of components which can be imitated is a function of the money invested in
imitative R&D, i.e. rM
i ¼i.
As to innovative R&D, ¯rms may have more or less specialized R&D activities, mean-
ing that they can concentrate their research e®ort only on one or a few components or
make extensive search on the entire vector of components. We call the scope of R&D
of ¯rm i, 1 · µi · n the number of components on which money for innovative R&D
is spent. Given the amount invested in R&D and the scope of research, ¯rms engaged
in innovative R&D make random draws in the space of components in the neighborhood
of their current value, where the size of the neighborhood is directly proportional to the
money invested and inversely proportional to the scope µi.
The routine for innovation is implemented as follows (patent infringement and patentabil-
ity tests will be discussed in detail in the next subsection): optimal price, corresponding
expected pro¯ts and expected sales are computed for the current product. A module (i.e.
a subset of components) of the vector representing the product is randomly chosen and
the value of some of its components is increased. As already mentioned, the number of
components which are improved is determined by the scope parameter µi and the size of
possible improvements is proportional to the ¯rm's R &D investment. After a check on
whether the new product infringes or not an existing patent, performance, optimal price,
expected sales and pro¯ts are computed knowing the demand schedule of all consumer
5As a future improvement we may introduce an adaptive learning procedure on these coe±cient of the
kind used in Winter (1984) and based upon a simple \satis¯cing" heuristic.
11and under the assumption that all other ¯rms will not change their behavior. If the prod-
uct has higher expected pro¯ts or equal pro¯ts and higher performance it is adopted. On
the other hand, if the innovation is not expected to increase pro¯ts (or performance with
equal pro¯ts), the ¯rm sticks to the old product.
The routine for imitation is performed only if there are ¯rms with higher pro¯ts,
otherwise the ¯rm does not attempt any imitation. When a ¯rm imitates, a target ¯rm is
chosen with probability proportional to pro¯ts among those with higher pro¯ts. Then a
module is randomly chosen among those forming the target product to be imitates. Being
xi
h the h ¡ th component of the imitating ¯rm's product i and x
j
h the same component
of the target ¯rm product j, all distances (x
j
h ¡ xi
h) are computed and xi
h is increased by
1, starting from components for which the distance from the target ¯rms is higher. In
case the new product does not infringe a patent, its performance, optimal price, expected
sales and expected pro¯ts are computed. Again, as in the case of innovations, the new
product is adopted (and possibly patented) if and only if it gives higher expected pro¯ts
or equal pro¯ts and higher performance.
3.4 Patents
In the framework outlined so far, one can easily model patents and their main charac-
teristics. When a ¯rm introduces a new product xi it can immediately (and costlessly)
obtain a patent on it if and only if the product meets the patentability standards, i.e. if
it di®ers \enough", both horizontally and vertically, from all products already protected
by a patent. In particular, two conditions have to be met for product xi to be granted a
patent:
1. H(xi;x¤) ¸ HP far all products x¤ holding a patent
2. and V (xi;x¤) ¸ VP far all products x¤ holding a patent
The parameters HP and VP are called, respectively, the horizontal and vertical patentabil-
ity standards and are parameters set by legal norms and by rules and practices of the
patent o±ces.
If a product x¤ is patented we assume that no other ¯rm can produce any product
which is similar \enough". Thus any new product xj has to satisfy the following two
conditions in order to be marketed:
1. H(xj;x¤) ¸ HA far all products x¤ holding a patent, except those patented by ¯rm
j itself
2. V (xj;x¤) ¸ VA far all products x¤ holding a patent, except those patented by ¯rm
j itself
12The parameters HA and VA are called, respectively, the horizontal and vertical amplitude
of patents and are also the outcome of legislation and judicial practice6. Such amplitude
parameters are important indicators of the strength of the patent system: the ampler a
patent the stronger the protection from imitation and the stronger the legal monopoly
power granted to the patent holder. Notice that, in general, HP 6= HA and VP 6= VA,
that is the requirements for obtaining a patent and those for legally selling a product
without infringing an existing patent may be di®erent, if anything because usually di®erent
institutional subjects are called to decide on either question, e.g. the patent o±ce and a
court7.
Finally, all patents have a ¯nite life as they expire after a number LP of iterations.
3.4.1 \Coarse" vs. \¯ne" patents
Our model of products as complex systems of interdependent components allows us to
tackle t he issue of the coarseness of patents. Patents are \coarsest" if they are granted
only on the whole product, if instead they are granted on each single component they
are \¯nest". In the latter case suppose that ¯rm i introduces a new value for component
xi
h and patents it. As a consequence, no other ¯rm will be allowed to market a product
whose h ¡ th component x
j
h is within a distance jx
j
h ¡ xi
hj < VA from it, nor to patent a
product containing a component x
j
h within a distance jx
j
h ¡ xi
hj < VP from it.
Finer patents place more restrictions on imitation. In fact, whereas a patent on a
single component xi
h prevents all other ¯rms from selling products containing that or
a similar component, if patents are instead granted only on whole products, that same
component could be sold by other ¯rm without breaching the patent, provided it is part of
a product that on the whole is su±ciently diverse from the patented one. Thus, granting
¯ner patents also witnesses an institutional framework more inclined to providing stronger
IPRs protection.
As already mentioned above, in a Coasian perspective and abstracting from transaction
costs, ¯ner property rights should inevitably lead to higher e±ciency as they increase the
internalization of knowledge externalities. However, we will show that in our model the
fragmentation of property rights is generally a source of long-run loss of social welfare and
decreases the speed of innovation.
4 Simulation results
The model outlined in the previous section is basically driven by innovation in components
and their interactions which yield the dynamics of the industry. In the following we shall
6See for instance O'Donoghue (1998) for a detailed analysis of the relationships between standard and
amplitude of patents and their consequences for sequential innovation.
7See again O'Donoghue (1998) for an analysis of the possible consequences of such di®erences
13present a few simulations8 highlighting some fundamental properties of the model. For
the sake of clarity we begin with a synthesis of the main results, then we provide some
details for each of them in the following subsections.
The main results can be summarized as follows:
² product complexity is an important cause of ine±ciency for a strong patent
system. In our model innovating ¯rms are capable of exploiting their competitive
advantage, reap high pro¯ts and re-invest them in further R&D activities. If product
complexity is low, this virtuous mechanism determines indeed a loss of e±ciency
due to prices which persistently remain above the competitive level and determines
higher concentration, but in the long run these e®ects are more than outweighed
by higher rates of innovation, higher product quality and higher overall consumers'
welfare. If on the contrary product complexity is high a strong patent system, in
addition to leading to higher prices and concentration, is also a cause of lower overall
rates of innovation and product quality growth.
² patent coarseness is an important institutional feature that determines the e±-
ciency of patent protection. Are patents granted only on whole products or also
on single components? We show that in the latter case patents are much more
likely to generate long run ine±ciencies even in environments characterized by low
complexity.
² moreover, granting \¯ne" patents on single components or small modules, causes a
distortion of market selection in favor of ¯rms with specialized and narrow R&D
against those with broad R&D scope. In complex product spaces this produces early
lock-in into suboptimal products.
4.1 The e®ect of product complexity
The ¯rst question we address is whether product complexity is a factor a®ecting the ef-
¯ciency of di®erent patent regimes. We mentioned above that concerns have been raised
on the possibility that in complex technologies a strong patent system may sti°e techno-
logical progress because of such phenomena as tragedies of the \anti-commons", patent
thickets and the like. Our model allows to test this concern in a more fundamental sense
and within a dynamic model of industry evolution.
We ran a series of simulations in which we tested the properties of di®erent patent
regimes in industries characterized by either low or high product complexity. Figures
8All simulations are run in the L.S.D. (Laboratory for Simulation Development) platform devel-
oped by Marco Valente. The platform may be downloaded along with manuals and tutorials at:
http://www.business.aau.dk/»mv/Lsd/lsd.html. Programs for the simulations described in this paper
may be obtained from the authors upon request.
141 throughout 5 report the time series of some key variables in an industry without in-
terdependencies among product components, with or without the possibility of patent
protection (holding equal all other parameters).
In the absence of product interdependencies patents do indeed, in our model, increase
overall e±ciency and welfare. This is essentially due to the assumption that ¯rms tune
their R&D investment on an unlimited knowledge of their returns. Although our ¯rms do
not choose the level of R&D investment with forward looking rationality but by routinely
investing a share of their pro¯ts, the (correctly estimated) higher pro¯ts that can be reaped
by innovators lead to higher R&D and further innovation.9 Overall product quality rapidly
increases and so does social welfare, in spite of higher prices and concentration. Notice
also that in the absence of interdependencies product innovation is relatively \simple", in
the sense that each component can be improved independently of the others: putting more
resources into R&D therefore increases the probability of ¯nding some better components,
and better components inevitably result into better products because of the separability
of the product system.






Figure 1: Average price, with patents (red) and without patents (black). (N=10,
no interdependencies)
9Notice that in our model ¯rms are rational enough to exploit the competitive advantage given by
product di®erentiation through innovation and maximize long-term pro¯ts. If we dropped this hypothesis
and let also pricing decisions be routinized, conclusions on the e±ciency of patents are likely to be be
di®erent, cf. Winter (1993).






Figure 2: Industry concentration (inverse Her¯ndal index), with patents (red) and
without patents (black). (N=10, no interdependencies)






Figure 3: Consumers' welfare, with patents (red) and without patents (black).
(N=10, no interdependencies)






Figure 4: Average product quality, with patents (red) and without patents
(black). (N=10, no interdependencies)






Figure 5: Maximum product quality, with patents (red) and without patents
(black). (N=10, no interdependencies)
17Figures 6 throughout 10 present the same variables for an industry characterized
instead by high technological interdependencies. It can be noticed that in this case, in
the absence of patent protection, not only are prices and industry concentration lower,
but also innovation and product quality show a consistently higher level and therefore
consumers' welfare is obviously higher without patent protection.
Given high interdependencies, innovation is far more complex a process. Innovative
path are fewer and far between than in the case without them: not only better components
have to be developed but they also have to ¯t together in speci¯c ways. Thus patents
have a much stronger blocking e®ect. In the case of low or no interdependency it is
possible to innovate around a patented product by selecting a path close to the border
around its \prohibited" neighborhood de¯ned by the patent amplitude. Any such path
will work and lead to legal innovation. On the contrary, if interdependencies are high
the only innovative paths leading to better products might be instead far away and a
vast space around a patented product (much larger than the neighborhood de¯ned by the
patent amplitude) may yield inferior paths. Thus in complex product spaces the actual,
de facto, amplitude of a patent is usually much greater than the one set de jure by legal
norms and practices.
6






Figure 6: Average price, with patents (red) and without patents (black). (N=10,
high interdependencies)






Figure 7: Industry concentration (inverse Her¯ndal index), with patents (red) and
without patents (black). (N=10, high interdependencies)






Figure 8: Consumers' welfare, with patents (red) and without patents (black).
(N=10, high interdependencies)






Figure 9: Average product quality, with patents (red) and without patents
(black). (N=10, high interdependencies)






Figure 10: Maximum product quality, with patents (red) and without patents
(black). (N=10, high interdependencies)
204.2 Coarse vs. ¯ne patents
At which level of granularity are ¯rms allowed to patent? That is, can ¯rms patent the
whole product, modules thereof or each single component? Coarse patents, granted only
on whole products or large modules prevent the marketing of products which are too close
(horizontally or vertically) in the whole product (or modules) space, while if each single
component is a patent per se, a product containing only one components which is similar
enough to a patented one can be prohibited.
This phenomenon, which is similar to the tragedy of the anticommons and to the
patent thicket problem described by the empirical literature, usually connected to the
complexity of products, can indeed emerge also in \simple" highly separable products, as
indicated by ¯gures 11 and 12, that report consumers' welfare and average product quality
in an industry characterized by full separability with two di®erent patents regimes, namely
one in which only whole products can be patented, and another one in which each single
components can be granted a separate patent. We can see that in the latter regime both
consumers' welfare and average product quality are inferior in spite of the separability of
product components.






Figure 11: Consumers' welfare, with coarse patents (red) and ¯ne patents (black).
(N=10, low interdependencies)






Figure 12: Average product quality, with coarse patents (red) and ¯ne patents
(black). (N=10, low interdependencies)
225 Conclusions
In this paper we have approached the study of the e®ects of patents on the dynamics of an
industry and on consumer welfare by means of a model of product innovation where ¯rms
search in a complex space of product characteristics and where heterogeneous consumers
have di®erent \ideal" product pro¯les and look for products with low prices, high quality
and close to their ideal pro¯le. A general conclusion is that product complexity is a
key factor determining the long run e±ciency or ine±ciency of the patent system. We
show that the virtuous circle higher pro¯ts, higher R&D expenditures and higher speed of
innovation might possibly work and outweigh the loss of welfare due to monopoly when the
complexity of the search space is low and therefore there are plenty of possible innovative
paths. This of course under the assumption that such virtuous circle correctly describes
the real and only appropriation mechanism. An assumption we ¯nd largely unjusti¯ed
as we argue in Dosi, Marengo, and Pasquali (2006). However, when complexity is high
innovative paths are fewer and far between because components have to be combined in
speci¯c ways: thus an innovative path may not have any viable alternative in its vicinity
and blocking it may considerably slow down further innovation.
These results provide support to perspective which departs from the standard analysis
of the costs and bene¯ts of patents grounded into a richer picture of technology and com-
petition. Whenever one abandons standard assumptions equating productive knowledge
to information and takes into account its speci¯cities with respect to sectors, technologies
and products, one immediately acknowledges that the same patent regime may have very
di®erent consequences under diverse knowledge domains. Indeed, one may well conclude
that IPRs, being \universal" rights, are too rough a device to strike the delicate balance
between competing interests that is involved in the appropriation of the economic bene-
¯ts of innovation. Property rights are probably an unfortunate juridical category for the
regulation of an issue that should be essentially one of ¯nely tuned industrial policy.
The diversity of technologies and markets should therefore be taken into primary
consideration when addressing the problem of incentives to innovation (as such an issue
overemphasized in the current literature). A mix of speci¯c policies, rather than universal
property rights, could better serve this purpose: diversity of problems requires diversity
of solutions.
The broad lesson from the analysis is that if the product space is complex, favoring
or blocking innovation in single components through patents has e®ects which propagate
throughout the entire product system in ways tend to hinder further innovative search.
Indeed, as most products in a modern economy are complex in the foregoing de¯nition, the
likely implication is that a mechanism of appropriation based upon intellectual property
rights is more often likely to be an obstacle, than an incentive, to innovation.
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